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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHURCH AND STATEShared Time: Indirect Aid to
Parochial Schools
For over forty years, public schools have been participating in
shared time programs pursuant to which non-public school children
attend public schools for instruction in one or more subjects during
the regular school day.1 Since ninety per cent of the pupils in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools are in Roman Catholic
schools,2 shared time-or, as it is also known, dual enrollmentraises questions of an establishment of religion in contravention of
the provisions of the first amendment to the Constitution. To date,
no court has faced this constitutional issue and only three state courts
have ruled upon the validity of shared time under state constitutions and statutes. Nevertheless, such questions are significant and
are becoming increasingly so. A National Education Association survey in 1964 revealed that 280 school systems in 35 states were operating shared time programs; 3 that the use of such programs has grown
considerably in recent years is indicated by the twenty-five per cent
increase in the use of shared time programs during the two years
immediately preceding the survey.4 Furthermore, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 specifically suggests
dual enrollment programs as a means by which local educational
agencies can obtain federal assistance for non-public school children.5
1. Wakin, Experiment in Educational Sharing, 60 REUGIOUS EDUCATION 43 (1965),
2, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBUC WELFARE, 88TH CONG., lsr SESS.,
PROPOSED FEDERAL PROMOTION OF "SHARED-TIME" EDUCATION 1 (Comm. Print 1963).
3. Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Study of Shared-Time Education
of the House Committee on Education c- Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 316 (1964). These
school systems are primarily concentrated in the midwestem states: Michigan (42),
Ohio (36), Illinois (27), Wisconsin (25), Minnesota (13), and Indiana (11).
4. Hearings on Shared-Time Education, supra note 3; Powell, Shared Time, 1961:
A Turning Point?, in REuGION AND THE PuBuc ORDER 73 (Giannella ed. 1964).
5. (a) A local educational agency may receive a basic grant or a special incentive
grant under this subchapter for any fiscal year only upon application therefor
approved by the appropriate state educational agency, upon its determination
(consistent with such basic criteria as the Commissioner may establish)

(2) that, to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived
children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled
in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for
including special educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment,
educational radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment)
in which such children can participate • • • •
79 Stat. 30 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 24le (Supp. I, 1965). (Emphasis added.) See generally
Comment, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act-The Implications of the
Trust-Fund Theory for the Church-State Questions Raised by Title I, 65 MICH. L. REv.
1184: (1966).
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The Nature of Shared Time Programs
The purpose of the shared time programs is to improve the education received by children in non-public schools. This is accomplished by allowing those children to study courses in the public
school which the public school may be in a better financial position
to offer. At the same time, the parochial school is able to channel
the funds which it would otherwise use for providing such instruction into strengthening its parochial school program. The religious
emphasis of a parochial school education remains intact since the
subjects which the parochial school pupil studies in the public school
are generally those which have little ethical value content, such as
industrial arts, home economics, science, mathematics, and foreign
Ianguages. 6 Subjects which stress values, such as English, social
studies, fine arts, and Christian doctrine, are taught in the parochial
school.7 Basically, the shared time programs follow one of two patterns. First, junior high school pupils may study only one or two
courses, generally industrial arts or home economics, in the public
school. 8 Or, second, parochial school pupils from both the junior
and senior high school level may spend approximately one-half of
every school day in the public school.9
In recent years, the merits of shared time programs have become
a subject of controversy. Some critics of shared time believe that it
will produce a fragmentation of the public school system through a
proliferation of parochial schools. 10 These critics further argue that
the divisiveness resulting from the development of such private
schools would be destructive of the allegiance to common traditions
implanted by a unified public school system. Since shared time programs must be open to all non-public schools on an equal basis, a
related fear is that such programs may encourage the formation of
private schools whose ideologies would include such rightist or leftist
groups as the John Birch Society or the Black Muslims. 11 Although
some increase in the number of parochial schools might be anticipated as a result of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
6. Wakin, supra note I, at 47. Typically, these courses also require expensive
equipment.
7. Ibid.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, DUAL ENROLLMENT IN PUBUC
AND NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as HEW]. Such a program exists in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where 4,831 children enrolled in the seventh and eighth
grades of parochial schools studied such courses in public schools in 1964-1965. Id. at 21.
9. Id. at 5. A shared time program of this nature was begun in 1963 in the Cherry
Hills School District in Michigan when 180 pupils enrolled at a parochial secondary
school attended a public school for three hours each day. Id. at 38.
10. Pfeffer, Second Thoughts on Shared-Time, 79 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 779 (1962).
11. Hearings on S. 370 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2898 (1965) (Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965).
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the increase should be marginal since the parochial school would
still have to finance the construction and operation of its educational
facilities and comply with minimum state educational standards.
It has also been suggested that shared time might encourage the
establishment of racially segregated private schools,12 but such segregation could be only partially achieved since the dually enrolled
students would still be taking some courses in the integrated public
school.
More significant is the fear voiced by the American Jewish Congress that public school officials in shared time programs may make
decisions which serve parochial school rather than public school
objectives.18 The most common example of such a situation would
be a decision to locate a new public school near a parochial school
so as to facilitate public school attendance by parochial school pupils,
although the needs of the public school district dictate a different
location.14 Such dangers can be avoided by requiring that the frame
of reference for such decisions be the promotion of primarily public,
rather than sectarian, purposes. The opposition of the American
Jewish Congress is also based on the fact that, in some shared time
programs, parochial school students are segregated while studying
in the public school, thus emphasizing rather than mitigating religious differences.15 Although such segregation may facilitate administration and scheduling, it is not essential to the successful operation of shared time and is a defect which can easily be remedied.
Indeed, the House and Senate debates on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act clearly indicate that shared time programs
under the act must avoid religious segregation.16
The American Civil Liberties Union has also opposed shared
time, warning that such programs may involve participation by
sectarian officials in decisions regarding such public school matters
as curriculum, textbooks, or the selection of teachers.17 However,
12. Id. at 2895.
13. Id. at 2557-60.
14. Such a situation arose when a parochial school proposed that the West AllisMilwaukee School Board locate a new public school across the street from the parish
school. The school board rejected this proposal since, in effect, the public school would
have served as a secular annex to the parochial school. Powell, supra note 4, at 76.
15. Hearings on S. 370, supra note 11, at 2557-60.
16. 111 CONG. REc. 5912-13 (1965); S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965).
See also Kelly &: La Noue, The Church-State Settlement in the Federal Aid to Educa•
tion Act, in R.EUGION AND THE Ptmuc ORDER 147-48 (Giannella ed. 1965).
17. American Civil Liberties Union, Position on Shared Time, April 4, 1965. The
ACLU's present opposition is also based on the contention that tax money is used to
support academic programs for children receiving their basic education in church
schools and, therefore, shared time violates the first amendment. Originally, the
Church-State committee of the ACLU had recommended that the ACLU not consider
shared time unconstitutional provided that: (1) shared time is offered on a nondiscriminatory basis to students of all church-related schools; (2) control of the
program is vested in public authorities; and (3) such programs serve public rather
than religious objectives. American Civil Liberties Union, Proposed Policy Recommendations on the Issue of Shared Time, May 29, 1964.
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the danger, if any, arising from such integral involvement of sectarian officials in public school matters could be avoided by requiring that all decisions regarding these matters be made by public
officials. Other critics suggest that shared time programs impose an
undue administrative burden on the public school, but while there
is undoubtedly some additional burden, public school administrators
who have participated in these programs have generally supported
them18 and administrative difficulties were not among the disadvantages cited by public school officials in the 1964 Health, Education
and Welfare Department (HEW) study on shared time.19
To Roman Catholics, shared time offers some benefits to offset
the burden of taxation for the support of public schools that their
children might not otherwise attend, a possibility of lower parochial
school tuition, and improved education for their children.20 However, the reaction of the Catholic community has been ambivalent
since shared time requires several departures from the Catholic concept of education. 21 First, the Catholic objective of having religion
permeate the entire curriculum22 may be frustrated when the Catholic student takes courses in the public school. However, since the
subjects which the parochial school student studies in the public
school are typically those which lack ethical value content, the interference with religious emphasis will most likely be minimal. Second,
shared time conflicts with the traditional Catholic view that boys
and girls should be taught separately during adolescence. 23 However, the disadvantage of departing from this tradition is surely insignificant when compared with the greater educational opportunities afforded Catholic children through shared time programs.24
From the perspective of the public schools, shared time programs
may reduce Catholic opposition to public school budgets and bond
issues by giving Catholics an interest in the public school system.25
Moreover, study in a pluralistic environment, which contributes
toward understanding and a reduction of prejudices among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, will be beneficial to both dually enrolled
and public school children.26 With few exceptions, dually enrolled
students and their parents were found by the HEW study to support
such programs.27
Finally, shared time programs may provide a viable compromise
18. Wakin, supra note 1, at 46.
19. See HEW at 7.
20. Ibid.
21. Wakin, supra note 1, at 44.
22. Symposium-Shared-Time, 57 REucmus
211. Id. at 19.
24. See Wakin, supra note 1, at 44.
25. Symposium, supra note 22, at 6.
26. Id. at 12.
27. See generally HEW.

EDUCATION

!i, 30 (1962).
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to the controversy regarding public support of non-public schools.28
Historically, public support of sectarian instruction has been prohibited in the several states29 and it is unlikely that direct aid to
parochial schools will ever be held constitutional.30 Assuming that,
in light of their educational function, some aid to parochial schools
is desirable, it is submitted that shared time is one vehicle for the
rendering of such aid, which, because the public funds are restricted
to the public schools, is not inconsistent with our historical policy.

Constitutionality of Shared Time Under the First Amendment
The first amendment to the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Since the first amendment has
been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and is therefore binding upon the states,31 it is necessary
to determine whether shared time programs constitute an establishment of religion within the meaning of the first amendment. For
this purpose, the program should be analyzed in light of the three
interrelated approaches which the Supreme Court has articulated
in its interpretation of the establishment clause.

I. The "Child Benefit" Theory
In Everson v. Board of Education, 32 the Supreme Court's first
extensive consideration of the establishment clause, the Court upheld a state statute providing for the reimbursement of expenses
incurred by parents in transporting their children by bus to parochial
as well as public schools. In interpreting the establishment clause,
the Court articulated what appeared to be a strict separationist test:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.33
28. Symposium, supra note 22, at 30.
29. KAUPER, REUGION AND THE CONsrITUTION 111 (1964).
30. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MEMORANDUM ON TIIE IMPACT OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION UPON FEDERAL Am TO EDUCATION, reprinted in
50 GEO. L.J. 351 (1961).
31. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
32. 330 U.S. 1 (1946). Some commentators question whether Everson is still good
law since Mr. Justice Douglas, who was one of the five man majority in Everson,
appears to have repudiated the Everson holding in his concurring opinion in Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962). See Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 and the First Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 307 (1966).
33. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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However, in disposing of the case, the Court implicitly departed
from this absolute standard of "no aid" and rested its decision on
the fact that, although benefit accrued incidentally to parochial
schools, the statute could be construed as public welfare legislation
designed to protect school children from the hazards of traffic. 34 The
Court thus relied on the "child benefit" theory, previously enunciated in Cochran v. Board of Education, 35 which in effect pennits the
state to extend certain welfare aids to students attending church-related schools without violating the establishment clause so long as
the benefit is given directly to the child and the benefits, if any,
received by the church-related school are wholly incidental to the
child's. "Child benefits" typically will include such services as school
bus transportation, secular textbooks, and medical care.36 Since
shared time promotes public welfare-education-and since the
benefit-opportunity to attend public school classes-accrues directly to the child with the parochial school benefiting only indirectly, it would appear that shared time programs could be sustained
under the "child benefit" approach of Everson.
On the other hand, it could be argued that shared time does directly aid religion since it releases funds which would otherwise be
used by the parochial school to provide the instruction offered in
the public schools and such funds can be used by the church for
other activities, including the expansion of the parochial school system. This benefit, however, may not be sufficiently direct to render
shared time programs unconstitutional, since, in Everson, the Court
specifically recognized that some of the children might not be sent
to the parochial schools if the parents were not reimbursed for their
childrens' bus fare. 37 In effect, therefore, the Court regarded the
tendency of the statute to increase the enrollment in parochial
schools as insufficient to render the statute unconstitutional.
2. Released Time Analogy
The Supreme Court's second approach to the establishment
clause may be found in Zorach v. Clauson. 38 In Zorach, the Court upheld a released time program pursuant to which public schools released their pupils during the school day for religious instruction in
34, Id. at 17-18.
35, 281 U.S. 370 (1930). In Cochran, the Court upheld a statute which provided for
the furnishing of free textbooks to children attending both parochial and public
schools. However, plaintiffs did not argue that the statute violated the first amend•
ment; instead, they contended that the statute constituted a taking of private property for a non-public purpose in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
36. See La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation
and Medical Care, 13 J. PuB. L. 76 (1964).
37. 330 U.S. at 17.
38. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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religious centers outside the public school. 39 Despite the fact that released time has a wholly religious purpose, the Court did not find
it violative of the establishment clause. If shared time were regarded
as an expanded released time program, it would clearly be constitutional under Zorach. 40 Admittedly, there is a difference between the
two programs: released time permits public school children to receive religious instruction in religious centers; shared time allows
parochial school children to receive secular instruction in the public schools.41 Nonetheless, this distinction seems to support the constitutionality of shared time, since if the public schools can accommodate religion when the purpose is religious instruction in
religious centers, surely they should be able to accommodate religion
when the end is secular instruction in the public schools.42
3. Accommodated Neutrality
In Abington School District v. Schempp, 43 the Supreme Court's
most recent consideration of the establishment clause, state statutes
requiring Bible readings at the beginning of the public school day
were declared unconstitutional. Reaffirming the principle that the
state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers, 44 the Court declared that, if legislation is
to withstand the test of the establishment clause, "there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion." 45 Indeed, the Court implied that this is the
"neutrality" which the Constitution demands. The Supreme Court
thus articulated the criteria which have been applied in previous
establishment clause cases: where the Court has found such compelling secular purposes as the protection of school children from
traffic hazards, 46 the establishment of a uniform day of rest,47 or the
operation of a hospital, 48 statutes which might have been suspect
under the establishment clause were deemed constitutional; however, where no legitimate secular purpose was to be served by the
39. Id. at 308. Previously, the Supreme Court, in Illinois ex rel. McCollom v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), had held unconstitutional a program permitting
sectarian teachers to hold weekly classes in the public schools.
40. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REY. 578, 594 (1962).
41. STOKES 8e PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 390 (1964).
42. In upholding the released time program, the Supreme Court emphasized that
when the state cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it accommodates the public service to the spiritual needs of
the community and thus follows the best of our traditions. 343 U.S. at 313-14.
43. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
44. Id. at 218.
45. Id. at 222.
46. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
47• .Braunfeld v• .Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
48• .Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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statute, the Court generally found the statute to be violative of the
clause and hence unconstitutional. 49 Analyzing shared time programs
in light of the Schempp approach, it is clear that such programs
satisfy the requisite two criteria: a secular legislative purpose and
a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion. 60 As
to the first, the purpose of shared time is to extend public school
instruction to students in church-related schools, clearly a secular
objective. Second, in order to satisfy the primary effect test, the state
may not employ essentially religious means in advancing its secular
ends, 61 but, since the means employed in shared time programs are
the public schools, no difficulty is encountered here.
The tenor of the Schempp opinion indicates that the neutrality
of which the Court speaks is not a strict neutrality but rather one of
accommodation. This conclusion is dictated in part by the Court's
emphasis on the compulsion which exists when the state requires
children to attend school and then subjects them to Bible readings
supervised by the teacher-a state employee; under a strict neutrality
test an examination of these coercive factors would not be necessary
since the mere fact that the Bible readings were directed at religious
rather than secular ends would be a sufficient basis for finding a
violation of the establishment clause.62 Additional support for this
conclusion may be drawn from Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Schempp, wherein he enumerates six types of permissible
programs in which the activity in question constitutes what may be
deemed an establishment of religion, thus making it clear that not
every connection between religion and the state is unconstitutional. 53
Admittedly, several of these activities involve situations in which
the establishment clause conflicts with the "free exercise of religion"
clause and, therefore, it is arguable that the courts have merely reconciled two seemingly conflicting constitutional provisions in favor of
the free exercise clause. However, even assuming the validity of this
49. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer prescribed by state Board of
Regents recited at beginning of each school day); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961) (affirmation of faith in God required as condition of holding public office);
Illinois ex rel. McCollom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction
on public school premises). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), where the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a released time program which had a wholly
religious purpose. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. See generally Moore,
The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free
Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 142 (1963).
50. 374 U.S. at 222.
51. See Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation,
in REUGION AND THE PUBUC ORDER 1, 13 (Giannella ed. 1963).
52. See KAUPER, REUGION AND THE CONSTlTIJTION 71-79 (1964).
53. 374 U.S. at 294-304. These six categories are: military chaplains, invocational
prayers in legislatures, the study of the Bible in public schools, tax exemption for
churches, religious considerations in public welfare programs, and activities, such as
the Sunday closing laws, which although religious in origin, have ceased to have
religious meaning.
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argument, it is obvious that shared time also involves issues which
relate to the free exercise of religion, particularly the educating of
one's child in the religious beliefs of the parents. 54 The Supreme
Court recognized in Sherbert v. Verner5 5 that enabling an individual
to enjoy welfare benefits without requiring him to violate his religious convictions is an accommodation which does not constitute an
establishment of religion. Sherbert is particularly applicable to an
analysis of shared time programs since the educational benefits of
shared time accrue to the individual rather than to the religious
institution, just as did the unemployment compensation benefits in
Sherbert.
Furthermore, a public school education is a benefit which the
state makes available to the entire community and the benefits which
the church receives by the attendance of Catholic children in public
schools under shared time programs are no different than the benefits it receives from such services as sanitation, police, and fire protection, which are also provided to the general public without regard
to religious beliefs. As the Everson Court emphasized, the state cannot exclude anyone from receiving public welfare benefits because
of his faith. 56 Since a parent has a right to educate his child in a
parochial rather than a public school, 57 and since the state has an
obligation to provide a public school education to all children in a
community, it should not be an establishment of religion within
the meaning of first amendment for the state to provide education
to parochial school students on a part time basis under a shared time
program. 58 Similarly, since it is not unconstitutional for a child to attend a parochial school full time, it should not be unconstitutional
for him to attend both a parochial and a public school.

Considerations at the State Level
Even if shared time programs do not violate the first amendment,
they must still overcome three obstacles at the state level: the constitutionality of such programs under state constitutions, the statu54. See Katz, Note on the Constitutionality of Shared Time, in R.EUGION AND THE
PU11UC ORDER 85, 89 (Giannella ed. 1964).
55. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held unconstitutional a state's denial
of unemployment compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who, because of
religious conviction, refused employment requiring work on Saturdays. The Court
emphasized that in so holding it was not fostering the establishment of the Seventh
Day Adventist church, but rather was merely reflecting neutrality. See generally KATZ,
RELlGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963); Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies
in Neutrality and Accommodation, in R.EuGION AND THE Puauc ORDER 1 (Giannella
ed. 1963); Moore, supra note 49.
56. 330 U.S. at 16.
57. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
58. See Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress and the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. R.Ev. 1395, 1453 (1966); Note, The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 and the First Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 311 (1966).
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tory power of local school boards to create such programs, and the
relationship of shared time to state compulsory education laws.
First, state constitutions are often more specific than the federal
constitution in prohibiting the expenditure of public funds for the
support of sectarian schools.159 For example, the Constitution of New
York provides:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use ... any public
money, ... directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance ... of any
school . . . under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught ....60
Although statutes authorizing bus transportation or free textbooks
to parochial school students have generally been held unconstitutional under such state constitutional provisions, 61 shared time programs need not suffer the same fate. A distinction between the two
types of programs may lie in the fact that the former aids the student
in receiving instruction in a parochial school whereas the latter
brings parochial school children into the public schools and therefore
fulfills a proper state function by providing a public school education
for all children in the community. Since the public schools are open
to all children, it cannot be violative of the state constitutions to
allow parochial school pupils to attend the public schools. Moreover, as the only court to face this question reasoned, shared time
59. See Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the First
Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302, 326 (1966). See generally ANTIEAU, CARROLL &: BURKE,
RELIGION UNDER TIIE STATE CON5rITUTIONS (1965); KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CON·
srITUTIONS (1964). There are some exceptions, such as ORE. CoNsr. art. 1, §§ 2-3,
which has been held to be identical to the provisions of the United States Constitution.
City of Portland v. Thornton, 174 Ore. 508, 149 P.2d 972, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 770
(1944).
60. N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 4. The Attorney General of New York has ruled that
shared time would violate this constitutional provision. OP. N.Y. ATT'Y GEN., July 15,
1965.
61. School bus statutes held unconstitutional: Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932
(Alaska 1961); Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966); McVey v. Hawkins,
364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla.
1963); Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949);
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962). Bus statutes
held constitutional: Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946); Snyder
v. Town of Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S.
299 (1961); Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956); Squires v. Inhabitants of
City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959); Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md.
314, 199 Atl. 628 (1938). Although a bussing statute was originally held unconstitutional
in Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938), the statute is now valid
in New York under an amendment to N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 4.
Free textbook statutes held unconstitutional: Board of Educ. v. Allan, 51 Misc. 2d
297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d
533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962). Free textbook statutes held constitutional:
Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929); Chance v.
Mississippi State Textbook Rating &: Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941).
See generally Note, 32 BROOKLYN L. REv. 362 (1966).
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does not contribute to the support of sectarian schools any more
than does allowing sectarian students to enroll in a public high
school upon graduation from a sectarian elementary or junior high
school. 62
A second obstacle presented at the state level is whether the state
statutes have delegated to the school boards the power to create
shared time programs. For example, shared time is specifically authorized by statute in Iowa,63 but it is probably prohibited in Louisiana.64 Most state statutes, however, do not deal specifically with
shared time, but rather contain provisions granting broad discretionary powers to the school boards in the operation of the public school
system.65 In construing such a statute in Morton v. Board of Education, 66 the Illinois Appellate Court found that the Chicago School
Board had sufficient statutory authority to sustain its creation of
shared time programs-a result that could be reached under most
state statutory schemes.
Finally, a problem may be posed by state compulsory education
laws, as interpreted by the courts. In Special District for the Education & Training of Handicapped Children v. Wheeler, 67 the Supreme
Court of Missouri declared that a child attending both a public and
a private school in one day would violate the Missouri compulsory
education law which required children "to attend regularly some
day school, public, private, or parish." 68 The court reasoned that its
decision was dictated by the use of the singular "school," for only
if the statute read "some day schools" would attendance at two
schools be permitted.69 However, as the dissent vigorously argued,
the purpose of such legislation is to insure that children receive a
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Wehrle v. Plummer, 21 Pa. Dist. 182, 186 (1911), aff'd
sub nom. Commonwealth v. School Dist. of Altoona, 241 Pa. 224 (1913). But cf. text
accompanying notes 36-37.
63. !oWA CODE § 257.26 (1962).
64. LA. REv. STAT. § 17-153 (1963) prohibits the operation of any public school in
connection or combination with any private school.
65. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 340.583 (1948) ("Every board shall establish and
carry on such grades, schools and departments as it shall deem necessary or desirable'').
But see 65 OP. Omo Au'y GEN. 10 (1965), in which the Attorney General ruled that
local school boards lack statutory authority for the creation of shared time programs;
such part-time attendance would require that an exception be made to the statutorilyprescribed requirement of five hours of class each day and there was no authority for
such an exception.
66. 69 Ill. App. 2d 38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966). The statute involved in this case
was ILL, REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18 (1963).
67. 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966). The program at issue was not shared-time but
rather a program under which parochial school children were released from part of
their regular school day to go to buildings maintained by the school district to receive
speech therapy. The holding, however, equally precludes the operation of shared-time
programs.
68. Mo. REv. STAT. § 164.010 (1959). (Emphasis added.) This statute has since been
amended specifically to include parochial schools. Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.031 (1965).
69. 408 S.W.2d at 63-64.
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certain minimum level of education and it should be immaterial
whether this education is received at more than one school.70 The
Morton court adopted this approach in construing the Illinois School
Code, which requires every child "to attend some public school ...
the entire time it is in session." 71 The Illinois Appellate court noted:
Since the object of the compulsory attendance law is that all children
be educated and not that they be educated in any particular manner
or place, part-time enrollment in a public school and part-time enrollment in a non-public school is permitted by section 26-1 [the
compulsory attendance law], so long as the child receives a complete
education.72

Such a construction is surely more enlightened and persuasive than
the approach of the Missouri courts and it avoids the anomalous
result of holding a parent who seeks to improve his child's education guilty of violating the state's compulsory education laws.73

Conclusion
To the children who attend non-public elementary and secondary schools, shared time offers an opportunity for improved education through expanded facilities. To the children enrolled in public
schools, shared time offers the same advantages by engendering
Roman Catholic support for public school expenditures. Since
shared time is effectuated within the framework of the public school,
it is not only consistent with our basic tradition of providing a public
education for all, but it also enables non-public school children to
share in this heritage. In addition, shared time furthers another basic
tradition-allowing the free exercise of one's religious beliefs
through the education of one's children in accordance with those
beliefs.
70. Id. at 66-67.
71. 69 III. App. 2d at 43-44, 216 N.E.2d at 307.
72. Id. at 45, 216 N.E.2d at 308.
73. The dissent in Wheeler also pointed out that, under the majority's holding,
a parent who transfers his child to another school after moving to a different community or a parent who allows his gifted high school-age child to attend junior college
classes would also be guilty of violating the Missouri compulsory education law. 408
S.W.2d at 66. Furthermore, the dissent noted that violation of the compulsory education laws is deemed a misdemeanor and, therefore, penal in nature. Ibid.

